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NEO-KANTIANISM IN GERMANY AND FRANCE 
Sebastian Luft and Fabien Capeilleres 
I. NEO-KANTIANISM IN GERMANY 
"Neo-Kantianism" is the name for a broad philosophical movement that sought to 
revive Kant's philosophy in a radically changed philosophical and, more broadly, 
cultural landscape. J It flourished especially in Germany, but also in France and, 
to a lesser extent, in Italy and a few other European countries (including Eastern 
Europe). It reached its apex between 1880 and 1920. In Germany, it grew out 
of a decidedly academic context - as opposed to "renegade" writers such as 
Kierkegaard, Schopenhauer, and Nietzsche, who disdained academic philosophy 
- although its origins lie, in part, in sociopolitical discourses stemming from of 
the societal problems posed by the Industrial Revolution and the worker ques-
tion (Arbeiterfrage) . The other background is the challenge posed to philos-
ophy by the impressively and quickly progressing natural sciences in the era of 
positivism. Both of these tendencies arose around the middle of the nineteenth 
century, in a time when, as was often noted, Hegel's system had "collapsed:' In 
both cases, to be elucidated below, the call was issued, "Back to Kant!,,2 
1. Sebastian Luft is primarily responsible for the sections dealing with neo-Kantianism in 
Germany, while Fabien Capeilleres is the primary author of the sections dealing with neo-
Kantianism in France. 
2. For a historical account of the origins of neo-Kantianism, see Klaus Christian Kohnke, 
Entstehung und Aufstieg des Neukantianismus: Die Deutsche Universitiitsphilosophie zwischen 
Idealismus und Positivism us (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1986), abridged English translation, The 
Rise ofNeo-Kantianism: German Academic Philosophy Between Idealism and Positivism, R. J. 
Hollingdale (trans.) (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), and Thomas Willey, 
Back to Kant: The Revival of Kantianism in German Social and Historical Thought, J 860-1914 
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The term "neo-Kantianism" was not used until the late 1880s, and then in a 
polemical fashion by its critics. The neo-Kantian movement, however, was (with 
the possible exception of the Marburg School), far from unitary and cohesive, 
as evidenced by the alternative names for this movement: (neo-)Criticism and 
neo-Fichteanism, among others. But around 1900, "neo-Kantianism" stuck. The 
demarcations concerning who belongs to this movement and who does not are to 
this day contested. Although it was a very broad movement, thinkers who might 
well be counted among its members - Nicolai Hartmann, Wilhelm Dilthey, or 
Edmund Husserl, for instance - are rarely included. In Germany, the neo-Kantian 
movement crystallized around the two "power centers": the "Marburg School" in 
Marburg, a small university town in the state of Hessia north of Frankfurt, and 
the "Southwest School" at the universities of Freiburg and Heidelberg. 
Given its academic location - all the neo-Kantians were university profes-
sors or professional academics - the neo-Kantian movement is also a history 
of successful university politics: neo-Kantianism in Germany soon exerted its 
power over nearly all German-speaking universities (including Switzerland and 
Austria), and its representatives were heavily involved in shaping hiring policies 
and academic curricula. Around the turn of nineteenth century, neo-Kantianism 
had attained what Jiirgen Habermas once called an "imperial stance" that lasted 
until its near collapse after the First World War and its total disintegration in 
Nazi Germany as of 1933. But its dissolution was in itself part of the legacy of 
neo-Kantianism: many of the leading neo-Kantians were Jews and, not surpris-
ingly, prosecuted by Hitler's fascist regime. The removal of the main neo-Kantian 
philosophers from academia and from German culture - most of them were left-
wing liberals anchoring the Weimar Republic in the values of the Enlightenment 
- was a consequence that reflected more than just official anti-Semitic policies. 
To many contemporaries, and Heidegger is here a good example of this attitude, 
the neo-Kantians represented not only a dated model of philosophy; in addi-
tion, their liberal politics, also diffusely associated with "Jewishness;' reflected 
a politics whose time had passed. When Heidegger, in a letter from 1929, railed 
against the "jewification of the German spirit" (Verjudungdes deutschen Geistes) , 
(Detroit, MI: Wayne State University Press, 1978). Brief overviews of the neo-Kantian move-
ment can be found in Hans-Ludwig Ollig, Der Neukantianismus (Stuttgart: Metzler, 1979), 
and Manfred Pascher, Einfiihrung in den Neukantianismus (Munich: UTB, 1997). A full- scale 
account of the neo-Kantian movement does not exist to this day, although certain thinkers or 
schools have been covered in greater detail. For work on the Marburg School, for example, cf. 
the important works by Holzhey (see bibliography), and for an historical account, cf. Ulrich 
Sieg, Aufstieg und Niedergang des Marburger Neukantianismus: Die Geschichte einer philoso-
phischen Schulgemeinschaft (Wiirzburg: Kiinigshausen & Neumann, 1994). The account here 
is indebted to and draws from all of these sources. 
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we see that "to be Jewish" was more than a creed; it was a philosophical as well 
as a political "lifestyle:'3 
Due to their dominant position between 1890 and 1914, the neo-Kantians 
were harshly attacked by nearly all the other philosophical movements that 
emerged after the First World War, including phenomenology, Lebensphilosophie, 
existentialism (Jaspers, the early Heidegger), and logical positivism. This critique 
of what was perceived as the dominant philosophical school in Germany became 
so much a part of the self-definition of these new tendencies that many, if not 
most, new philosophical movements and ideas cannot be understood without 
at least a basic knowledge of the neo-Kantian paradigms and theories that 
they argued against. Defining one's own project vis-a-vis the neo-Kantians 
became almost the modus operandi in many a philosopher's work, and we see 
this in Husserl's transcendental-eidetic phenomenology, Scheler's value ethics, 
Heidegger's hermeneutics of facticity, and Carnap's and the Vienna School's 
attempt at a "truly" scientific philosophy. 
In short, the history of late-nine tee nth- and early-twentieth-century philos-
ophy cannot be adequately assessed without knowledge of neo-Kantianism. It 
is curious, then, to note that for over forty years (essentially after the Second 
World War) , neo-Kantianism has been largely ignored by scholarship. As of the 
1980s, however, increasing attention in Europe has been directed toward the 
work of the neo-Kantians and the importance of neo-Kantianism has also been 
brought to the fore by some scholars in North America. It is to be anticipated 
that neo-Kantianism will also become a widely discussed field of research in 
the next decade in North America for scholars working in the history of philos-
ophy, history and philosophy of science, philosophy of culture, and "continental 
philosophy:' broadly construed. This revival "is evidenced by a good number of 
international conferences held in the past decade not only in Germany, France, 
and Italy, but also in the United States. 
Despite the important role of neo- Kantianism in the philosophical landscape 
of the time, it is, ironically, hard to point to any seminal works by any of the 
major figures. Of these major figures, Hermann Cohen, Paul Natorp, Wilhelm 
Windelband, and Heinrich Rickert were the most famous, along with Ernst 
Cassirer, whose writings were widely received and translated. This is not to say 
that the literary output was not most impressive: all of these philosophers wrote 
books at the rate at which most academics today write articles. Nevertheless, 
some of the systematic approaches of the neo-Kantians have to be pieced together 
through a synopsis of several works. This dearth of "seminal works" also has phil-
osophical reasons; it has to do with the nature of the neo-Kantian movement itself 
3. Quoted in Peter E. Gordon, "Neo-Kantianism and the Politics of Enlightenment;' The Philo-
sophical Forum 39(2) (2008),235. 
49 
-
SEBASTIAN LUFT AND FABIEN CAPEILLERES 
and the type of work that it did and promoted - despite all differences of outlook 
and emphasis. Hence, to understand the distinct character of the neo-Kantian 
movement, let us return to its origins in the then-contemporary political thought 
and natural science. 
Friedrich Albert Lange (1828-75) and Otto Liebmann (1840-1912) 
might both be considered "fathers" of neo-Kantianism. Lange published two 
works in 1865, which became defining works for the nascent movement, Die 
Arbeiterfrage (The worker question) and Geschichte des Materialismus (History of 
Materialism), while Liebmann's Kant und die Epigonen (1865) was very popular 
at the time. Both of Lange's books tackle the issue of the modern conditio 
humana and the problems arising from humankind's situation in the industrial 
age, which posed many new and hitherto unknown challenges (mass society, 
the problem of the working class, etc.). Lange also participated in the Vereinstag 
Deutscher Arbeitervereine, the German Workers' Association, an ancestor of the 
German Social Democratic Party (the SPD). However, as the title Geschichte des 
Materialismus indicates, Lange attempted to place these concrete problems into 
a larger philosophical context. The problem was, in his opinion, "materialism" 
and its disdain of human spirit and "idealistic" values in a broadly conceived 
sense of the term, along with materialism's tendency to reduce humans to func-
tioning wheels in the machinery of modern industrial society. Hence, a decid-
edly political sense of "idealism" runs through neo- Kantianism. This tendency 
led to interesting and - judging from political debate among social democrats 
worldwide - still valid social-democratic ideas, which took hold especially in 
the Marburg School. Both Hermann Cohen and Natorp, for example, promoted 
what they called "social idealism" as an explicit rejection of a socialism stem-
ming from the Marxist tradition. Thus, in reconstructing the origins of neo-
Kantianism, one needs to keep in mind this political background and the societal 
context that the neo-Kantians attempted to address in a Kantian vein, while 
Marxist ideas were developing in elsewhere in Germany, England, and Russia. 
The other origin, which connects more directly to Kant and hence constitutes 
the general alliance with the Sage of Konigsberg and "Kantianism" in a broader 
sense, came, interestingly enough, from within the natural sciences. Here scien-
tists confronted the problems that arose once natural science became "scien-
tific" in the modern sense of the term, and the speculative Naturphilosophie 
of the German Idealists and the Romantics, especially Schelling,4 became an 
object of ridicule. It was in fact a scientist - Hermann von Helmholtz (1821-
94) - who, in his physical and optical experiments, discovered the influence of 
the observer on that which was being observed. In his famous speech Ober das 
*4. For a discussion ofScheUing, see the essay by Joseph P. Lawrence in The History ojContinental 
Philosophy: Volume 1. 
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Sehen des Menschen (On man's seeing, 1855), he attempted to formulate these 
ideas in Kantian terms, claiming that "all cognition of reality must be derived 
from experience:' In this manner, he thought that his study of the physiology 
of the senses had confirmed in a scientific manner Kant's "organization of the 
mind;' namely "that the manner of our perceptions is equally determined by the 
nature of our senses as through external objects:'5 Hence, experimental natural 
science seemed to confirm Kant's transcendental turn, without, however, the 
idealist baggage that burdened both Kant and his idealist aftermath. Early neo-
Kantian philosophers such as Cohen soon took up this challenge and placed 
Helmholtz's ideas on a firmer philosophical foundation. While they welcomed 
the fact that an experimental scientist had made the way "back to Kant;' they felt 
that this move took place in the (problematic) spirit of naturalism. As a result, 
the scientists' return to Kant received an enthusiastic reception on the part of 
philosophers of the Kantian stripe, but the neo-Kantians also felt that this scien-
tific return to Kant needed to be monitored carefully. The close connections to 
the sciences became one of the trademarks of neo-Kantianism. In an unfavor-
able reading, which, however, became popular (and which one still finds quoted 
today), neo-Kantianism was criticized in this vein for reducing philosophy to the 
"handmaiden of the sciences:' While this description is, as we shall see, unfair, 
it is true that the proximity to scientific endeavors and a reflection on the status 
and nature of the sciences - both the natural and the human sciences - became 
a dominant characteristic that defined and popularized neo-Kantian ideas. 
Helmholtz's work exemplifies the rehabilitation of Kantian philosophy that 
emerged from discussions within the sciences and the philosophy of science. 
The call to return to Kant was soon taken up by philosophers or those - such 
as Cohen, who started out as an experimental psychologist - who turned to 
philosophy under this influence. Yet, once Kant had become re-established as an 
eminent philosophical figure with whom to approach epistemological questions 
in the sciences, another field of activity emerged that also helped to strengthen 
the overall stance of the neo-Kantian movement within Germany, namely Kant 
philology and Kant scholarship. With the development of rigorous philology in the 
nineteenth century and new editorial techniques arose the inauguration of critical 
Kant editions that adhered to these new standards. "Complete Works" editions 
had up to then either not existed or were, for example, in the notorious case of 
Hegel, not philologically sound in the light of contemporary editorial practices. 
Under the influence of Wilhelm Dilthey, the Kant edition initiated by the Berlin 
Academy of the Sciences, begun in 1900 and staffed by philosophers in the neo-
Kantian vicinity - Erich Adickes, Benno Erdmann, and others - stands (for the 
5. Quoted in Helmut Holzhey, "Der Neukantianismus;' in Geschichte der Philosophie, vol. 12, 
H. Holzhey and W. Rod (eds) (Munich: Beck, 2004), 3 1. 
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most part) the test of modern editorial philology. The importance of this edito-
rial work for the dissemination of Kant's philosophy cannot be overemphasized. 
In addition to the Berlin edition, the late nineteenth century saw an impres-
sive proliferation of commentaries on Kant's works. Some of the classical Kant 
scholarship produced then - commentaries by Cassirer, Cohen, Hans Vaihinger, 
and others - are to this day classics of Kant research. These basic readings defined 
the main avenues in which Kant would subsequently be read. In other words, 
what the neo-Kantians achieved, actively and conscientiously, was a canoniza-
tion of Kant as he is perceived today: as the towering figure in modern philos-
ophy. This is not to say that this status is not due to Kant's philosophy itself; 
however, a writer needs a functioning "transmission belt" that conveys one's 
thoughts to the readers. This is what the neo-Kantians achieved in an exemplary 
manner. While this might seem tangential to the actual philosophical importance 
of neo-Kantianism, it is indeed not to be dismissed, as it established both Kant 
in the position seen today and, in turn, the neo-Kantians as the "true" heirs of 
this seminal figure in the history of Western philosophy. 
Since the neo-Kantian movement is anything but a unified school, we shall 
now turn to the Marburg School and the Southwestern School, respectively, to 
discuss their mutual contributions to modern philosophy. This short historical 
overview will have to confine itself to these two main groups.6 
The Marburg School: Hermann Cohen, Paul Natorp, Ernst Cassirer 
The Marburg School is the most "compact" group within neo- Kantianism, 
judging from its self-understanding and outward projection. This unity is due to 
the method that its founder, Hermann Cohen (1842-1918), developed out of his 
Kant interpretation. This method is called the Transcendental Method, in recogni-
tion of Kant's method, although the term is itself not to be found in Kant's oeuvre. 
This focus on method has led some to accuse the Marburg School of a "method-
ological fanaticism:'7 although we shall see that the method itself plays a crucial 
role in the Marburg School's epistemological paradigm. Surrounded by a very 
6. As mentioned, most philosophy departments in Germany and Austria were dominated 
by neo-Kantians and to do justice to this movement as a whole one would have to discuss 
figures whose names can merely be listed here: the largely independent Richard Honigswald 
(!875-1947) in Breslau (Gadamer's first teacher there), later Munich; the critical realist Alois 
Riehl in Graz (1844-1924); the philosopher oflaw Leonard Nelson (1882-1927); Jonas Cohn 
(1869-1947) in Freiburg; Bruno Bauch (1877-1942), the editor of Kant Studien; and for the 
youngest generation of neo- Kantians after the Second World War, sometimes referred to as 
"neo-neo-Kantians" (a somewhat excessive title), Richard Zocher (1887-1976), Hans Wagner 
(1917-2000), and Wolfgang Cramer (1901 -74), father of Konrad Cramer (1933-). 
7. Cf. Hans-Georg Gadamer, "Paul Natorp:' in Paul Natorp, Philosophische Systematik (Hamburg: 
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wide, national as well as international, circle of pupils and adherents, the main 
figures of this group are Hermann Cohen, Paul Natorp (1854-1924) and Ernst 
Cassirer (1874-1945). Cassirer is sometimes not counted as belonging to the 
Marburg School, although he is acknowledged to be one of the most significant 
philosophers who emerged from the neo-Kantian tradition as a whole. Unlike 
Cohen and Natorp, who were professorial colleagues at the University of Mar burg 
and formed a unique coalition of great influence both within and outside the 
university, Cassirer was a generation younger and never actually taught in 
Marburg. The offspring of a rich Jewish family with relatives in Berlin, Munich, 
and Vienna, Cassirer rather disliked small-town life such as that of Marburg, a 
city with a population of some 30,000 at the time. Still, for reasons to be discussed, 
he deserves to be counted among the Marburg School and its method. 
Cohen was by all accounts the dominant figure of this school; being also a 
charismatic and irritable character,S he was the main attraction for students who, 
after his arrival in Marburg in 1873, soon flocked around him. His ally Natorp 
was initially one of them, but soon secured his own position at the university, 
first as a librarian, then later, with Cohen's mentorship, as a professor. Cohen 
taught in Marburg until his retirement in 1912. He spent his last years living in 
Berlin teaching at the Lehranstalt fur die Wissenschaft des Judentums (Academy 
for the Science ofJudaism), where he taught mainly on Judaism and the philos-
ophy of religion and was influential on a newer generation of thinkers such as 
Franz Rosenzweig and Martin Buber.9 
Cohen first made a name for himself through his influential commentaries 
on Kant's three Critiques. The commentary on the First Critique, entitled Kants 
Theorie der Erfahrung (Kant's theory of experience), became especially influ-
ential for Kant scholarship as well as for th-e popularization of the "Marburg 
Method:' Once these three voluminous commentaries were completed (1912), 
Cohen turned to composing his own "System of Philosophy" in three volumes 
analogous to Kant's Critiques - Logik der Reinen Erkenntnis (Logic of pure 
8. As will become evident below in the treatment of Cohen's closest collaborator, Natorp, they 
seemed to have, as eyewitnesses report, polar opposite characters. Whereas Natorp was gener-
ally perceived as solid and reliable, Cohen seemed to have a choleric temper, which he did not 
even attempt to keep under wraps and which was directed at different people and peoples. 
To give just one example, Cohen, who discovered his Jewish roots after the Dreyfus affair, 
despised assimilated Jews and did not hold back judgment. One person whom he vilified in 
this way was, for instance, Husser!; see quotations from Cohen's correspondence with Natorp 
in Sebastian Luft, "Reconstruction and Reduction: Natorp and Husser! on Method and the 
Question of Subjectivity:' in Neo-Kantianism in Contemporary Philosophy, Sebastian Luft and 
Rudolf Makkreel (eds) (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 2009), 84-5 n.3_ 
9. For a historical account of Cohen's interesting life, see Helmut Holzhey, "Cohen and the 
Marburg School in Context:' in Hermann Cohen's Critical Idealism , Reinier Munk (ed.) 
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cognition), Ethik des Reinen Willens (Ethics of pure willing), and Asthetik des 
Reinen Gefuhls (Aesthetic of pure sentiment) - which appeared between 1902 
and 1912. A transitional work, but from a developmental standpoint crucial, 
since it allowed Cohen to explicitly formulate his "transcendental method" 
(the centerpiece of the Marburg School), was the small study Das Prinzip der 
Infinitesimal-Methode und seine Geschichte (The principle of the infinitesimal 
. . 
method and its history). Cohen's system was supposed to be rounded off by 
a fourth part, a psychology explicating the "unity of cultural consciousness;' 
but Cohen passed away before beginning it. Shortly before his death, Cohen 
completed his late manuscript on religion, Religion der Vernunft aus den Quellen 
des Judentums (Religion of reason out of the sources of Judaism), which was 
published posthumously and recently has attracted considerable attention in 
the philosophy of religion and Jewish studies. 
To understand Cohen's original approach culminating in the "transcendental 
method;' one must first assess his Kant interpretation. The thesis that Cohen 
boldly puts forth claims that with his Copernican turn Kant founded nothing less 
than a new concept of experience. Experience is not mere perception or intuition, 
but establishes laws about 'that which is experienced. In other words, according 
to Cohen, the experience Kant is talking about is that of the scientist. Cohen 
famously declares that Kant conceived his revolutionary Copernican turn as he 
meditated on Newton's Principia Mathematica. "Not the stars in the heavens;' he 
writes, "are the phenomena, but the astronomical data that the scientist estab-
lishes, these are the contents of experience:'lo The experience of the scientist, in 
establishing laws of nature, thereby constructs nature as a mathematical universe. 
For Kant, Newtonian physics exists and, because of its mathematical method, 
is able to give rise to synthetic judgments a priori. In Cohen's interpretation, 
Kant's question concerning the transcendental condition of the possibility of 
a priori cognition is really concerned with the question of how those a priori 
truths established in natural (physical) science become possible and how they 
can be justified. The accepted cornerstone - which Kant called the factum -
that philosophy has to clarify is the "factum of the sciences" (das Faktum der 
Wissenschaften) in which reality is constructed. Taking cues from the analytiC 
method Kant pursues in the Prolegomena, this entails that philosophy's job is to 
reconstruct the conditions of possibility through which this factum comes about. 
The manner in which Cohen recasts Kant's transcendental turn is, essen-
tially, by rejecting the two stems doctrine (concepts and intuitions). His solu-
tion is Hegelian, as he grounds all knowledge and experience of reality in a 
priori concepts. Reality as experienced is constructed through and through, and 
10. Hermann Cohen, Kants Iheorie der Erfahrung (New York: Olms, [1871] 1987),20-21. All 
translations from the German are my own. 
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this construction occurs through the use of concepts that are applied to what is 
experienced. Cohen grounds this premise on the discovery of the infinitesimal 
in mathematics, according to which all entities are constructed in thought on 
the basis of the category of the infinitesimally small. II Since these concepts are a 
priori (Cohen prefers the word "pure"), reality as we encounter it is constructed 
in pure thought. The task of philosophy is to lay the foundations of objective 
knowledge in pure thought, but the laying of these foundations is modified by 
scientific progress. That is, scientific progress makes new concepts necessary, 
and since all scientific cognition is in principle falsifiable, the foundations them-
selves are subject to constant re-evaluation and scrutiny. Philosophy is no longer 
a science of ultimate foundations (Grundlagenwissenschaft) - the traditional task 
of metaphysics prior to Kant's transcendental turn - but is a science of laying 
foundations (Grundlegungswissenschaft) in "pure thought:' 
Cohen's transcendental method grounds all knowledge of the world in pure 
thought. But Cohen's restatement of Kant's transcendental idealism operates on 
the basis of an unacknowledged Hegelian influence. This influence consists in 
the notion that the system of categories is not a "static" table of concepts, estab-
lished once and for all, but something that evolves over time. This evolution, now 
departing from Hegelian idealism, is not that of absolute spirit but of scientific 
progress "on the ground:' Theoretical philosophy becomes a logic of categories 
that have their origin in pure thought, and epistemology is recast as a "logic of 
origin" (Ursprungslogik), in which self-generated categories in thought (as their 
origin) become constituted as functional (not substantial) categories, forming 
a web of relations as a matrix for orientation in thought. This is to say that 
what Cassirer later formulated in his reconstruction of the shift from ancient to 
modern science - the move from a substance to a functional ontology - in effect 
already takes place in Cohen's logic. Cohen's late philosophy in his logic of origin 
differs from Hegel's, accordingly, in that thought categories lay the foundations 
for scientific thought. This logic is not, in other words, a "self-constructing path;' 
as Hegel calls his method, but an a priori foundation of scientific thinking in 
an a priori category system that is itself dynamic and ever-evolving. For Cohen, 
philosophy is the justification of the factum that is already established (the math-
ematical sciences) and reconstructs their constructive activity, thereby justifying 
the knowledge claims of the scientist. 
This abbreviated discussion of Cohen's philosophical system - his ethics, 
aesthetics, and political philosophy have been passed overl 2 - has focused on 
11. See Hermann Cohen, Das Prinz ip der Infinitesimal-Methode und seine Geschichte (Berlin: 
Bruno Cassirer, 1883). 
12. For more elaboration of his system, see Andrea Poma, The Critical Philosophy of Hermann 
Cohen (Albany, NY: SUNY Press, 1997); Geert Edel, Von der Vernunftkritik zur Erkenntnislogik 
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the transcendental method that forms the nodal pOint around which the other 
two significant thinkers of the Marburg School constructed their systems. The 
principle of human beings' construction of reality provides the crucial element 
for understanding this school. Reality, insofar as it is entirely constructed by the 
activities of the human spirit, of which scientific thought is merely one, albeit 
its most dignified, application, is the reality of humanity's cultural activities. The 
Marburg School is in this sense unified as outlining an encompassing transcen-
dental philosophy of culture. 13 In the Marburg reading, to quote Cassirer, Kant's 
critique of reason is recast as a "critique of culture:' 
Natorp, after wavering between pursuing a career as a classical philologist, 
musician, or philosopher, finally came to focus on philosophy and moved to 
Marburg to study under Cohen. Cohen soon incorporated him into his growing 
group of collaborators. An avid student of the natural sciences and mathematics, 
Natorp was probably the most erudite member of this school. He wrote on ancient 
philosophy, ancient and modern science, social and political philosophy, and, 
last but not least - since his Chair was also dedicated to pedagogy - pedagogical 
philosophy, especially that of Heinrich Pestalozzi. A more agreeable character l4 
and also a lucid writer - Cohen's writings were considered dense and difficult -
Natorp helped the Marburg School gain a broader acceptance and popularity than 
Cohen himself would have been able to achieve. Given the openly anti-Semitic 
sentiment in large parts of German society and especially German academia, it 
is likely that, without Natorp on his side, Cohen, clearly the most innovative neo-
Kantian, would have remained isolated and far less influential in the academic 
landscape of his time. The Marburg School must be seen as constituted by both 
individuals: Cohen, sometimes referred to as "minister of the exterior;' and 
Natorp, dubbed "minister of the interior:' Together they formed a powerful alli-
ance and a functioning collaboration that lasted more than a quarter century. IS 
In addition to his writings on figures in t-he history of philosophy - most 
notably Plato - and on special problems in the philosophy of science, Natorp 
(Freiburg and Munich: Alber, 1988); and the contributions in Hermann Cohen's Critical 
Idealism, Reinier Munk (ed.) (Dordrecht: Springer, 2004). . 
13. See Ursula Renz, Die Rationalitat der Kultur: Zur Kulturphilosophie und ihrer transzendentalen 
Begrundung bei Cohen, Natorp und Cassirer (Hamburg: Felix Meiner, 2002). 
14. Cf. footnote 8 above for an illustration of Cohen's character. For an example of Natorp's 
greater effect on the scientific community of his day, one can point out that nearly all state-
ments of the Marburg School that were received in the philosophical and wider publiC 
stemmed from Natorp's pen; for the logical method of the Marburg School, for example his 
Die logischen Grundlagen der exakten Wissenschaften (actually Cohen's domain), and for a 
general, and popular, expression of the Marburg School as a whole, one should note that 
Natorp's Philosophie: Ihr Problem und ihre Probleme (discussed in the main text above), was 
first published in 1911 and was re-edited four times during Natorp's lifetime. 
15. Cf. Sieg, Aufstieg und Niedergang des Marburger Neukantianismus. 
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was also the only notable neo-Kantian who was able to write an unusually brief 
(ISO pages) and bestselling treatise: Philosophie: Ihr Problem und Ihre Probleme 
(Philosophy: its problem and its problems). This text, which is a lucid "mission 
statement" of Marburg neo-Kantianism, has perhaps rightfully been consid-
ered the Programmschrift of the entire neo-Kantian movement. Yet Natorp's 
initial fame was based on his influential 1903 work on Plato: Platos Ideenlehre: 
Eine Einfuhrung in den Idealismus (Plato's theory of ideas: an introduction to 
idealism). As the title indicates, Natorp's peculiar interpretation concerning 
Plato's theory of the Forms is that it is really an epistemological position -
idealism - rather than a metaphysical one. More specifically, Natorp claims, 
Plato's ideas are nothing but natural laws that govern physical entities. Laws are 
that which make things what they are, what is "valid" about them. Soon after 
its publication, this bold thesis was harshly criticized, since it seems to read 
Newtonian physics and Kant's transcendental turn back into Plato's premodern 
thought; but given the close alliance with modern science, this reading is perhaps 
less surprising stemming from a Marburger than it first appears. In this sense, 
Natorp's Plato is less a work of Plato exegesis than a restatement of the type of 
idealism professed in the Marburg School. 16 
Natorp's most substantial philosophical contribution to the Marburg School 
was his psychology and concomitant theory of subjectivity. Dismissed by 
Cohen - although not openly - Natorp's idea of a philosophical psychology 
started out as a side project when he published in 1888 his short Einleitung in 
die Psychologie nach Kritischer Methode (Introduction to psychology according 
to critical method). This later turned into a full-fledged, yet ultimately aban-
doned, project when he published the "second edition" Allgemeine Psychologie 
nach Kritischer Methode (General psychology according to critical method), 
which had grown to 350 pages, more than three times its original size. In 1887, 
he published the influential article "Ueber Objective und Subjective Begriindung 
der Erkenntniss" (On objective and subjective grounding of cognition), where 
he systematically laid out his idea of a philosophical- not experimental, as in the 
Brentano and Wundt Schools - psychology. 
Natorp's psychology grew directly out of problems that he saw with the tran-
scendental method. If the latter is about constructing reality, all that this method 
accounts for philosophically are the finished "products" such as scientific theo-
ries; these are the "outcome" of humanity's creative activity. In other words, all 
16. It is interesting to note that Natorp somewhat recanted his earlier reading in a "MetacriticaJ 
Appendix" of the second edition in 1921; cf. Plato's Theory of Ideas: an Introduction to Idealism, 
Vasilis Politis and John Connolly (trans.) (Sankt Augustin: Academia, 2004). For Natorp's 
Plato interpretation and its importance for the Marburg School, cf. Karl -Heinz Lembeck, 
Platon in Marburg: Platon-Rezeption und Philosophiegeschichtsphilosophie bei Cohen und 
Natorp (Wlirzburg: Konigshausen & Neumann, 1994). 
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that philosophy was to do was justify after the fact what the sciences were "always 
already" doing. What was missing was an account of the creative, subjective 
life that creates these cultural products. This should be, Natorp asserted, the 
task of a critical psychology. Its purpose was, more precisely, to recover this 
creative, subjective life by going in the opposite direction of the transcendental, 
constructive method. That is to say, it should proceed reconstructively from the 
finished products back to the creative life that was involved in their constructive 
processes. Metaphorically, Natorp described the psychological, reconstructive 
method as a "minus" vis-a-vis a "plus" direction on one and the same line. What 
was to be regained would be this active, dynamic life that had come to a standstill 
once cultural products had been formed. This method should remain faithful to 
the essentially dynamic life of consciousness. All other psychological approaches 
treated consciousness with objectifying methods; when reading accounts of 
consciousness, Natorp complains, he feels as though he is walking through a 
morgue instead of studying bodies filled with life. 17 The reconstructive method 
was the method to finally overcome this problem. At the same time, given the 
metaphor of the plus and minus directions, it is clear that the reconstructive 
method is entirely dependent on the transcendental method; Natorp calls it its 
"inverse" application. That is, the reconstructive method of psychology serves a 
transcendental-philosophical function within the overall Marburg Method that 
was to account for subjectivity in all of its dimensions - in its cultural products 
and in its dynamic status nascendi - hence, psychology "according to critical 
method:' Natorp's intention was not that this should replace or be in compe-
tition with experimental psychologies, but that it was intended to add a piece 
within the overall transcendental epistemology that the Marburg School had 
taken over from Kant, but which would remain incomplete unless this "subjec-
tive" part was supplied. 
The subjective life, once it had been discovered through reconstruction, 
Natorp frames in terms of what he calls "conscious-ity" (Bewusstheit). Through 
this neologism he attempted to capture the very fact of "being conscious" of 
conscious life, with its conscious contents. Moreover, his reconstructive method 
would proceed genetically, that is, it would provide not static laws (of objectifying 
science), but genetic accounts of the dynamic life of consciousness, going down 
to the origins of consciousness where one cannot even speak of "consciousness" 
any longer. In his late work, Natorp simply calls it "life." Other than these prin -
cipal philosophical insights, however, the actual results ofNatorp's psychology 
were meager and Natorp himself abandoned the opposition between objective 
17. Paul Natorp, Allgemeine Psychologie nach Kritischer Methode (Tiibingen: MohrlSiebeck, 1912), 
16, 3 1. As Natorp explains there, an example of such "objectivist" treatment is the application 
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and subjective methods in favor of a more deeply grounded "all-method" that 
synthesized both subjectivist and objectivist methods. In his somewhat idio-
syncratic late philosophical system, Natorp was seen to have departed from his 
Marburg roots (as some critics, clearly under the influence of Heidegger, have 
remarked), 18 and given this verdict, Natorp's late system has been vastly under-
appreciated. Challenging the fundamental assumptions of Kant's philosophy as 
well as that of the Marburg School as a whole, the question as to how one should 
ultimately interpret this school turns on the issue of whether it represents the 
final fulfillment of Kant's intentions if one spells out the implications of tran-
scendental philosophy, or whether it is a radical departure from the Kantian 
paradigms. At any rate, his psychological method and his account of subjectivity 
have had significant impact on other theories, including Husserl's phenomen-
ology and Heidegger's fundamental ontology of Dasein. 
Cohen and Natorp formed such a close alliance that differences between 
them tended to remain subdued and un articulated (either in public or even 
between them).19 When Cohen left Marburg for Berlin in 1912, Natorp, who 
remained in Marburg until his death in 1924, experienced something of a renais-
sance. In his lectures he developed his original philosophical system, which 
he worked on until his last days. In his late thought he wanted to form an all-
encompassing method, incorporating mystical elements into a totalizing philo-
sophical system. The manuscript, which was prepared for publication by Natorp 
himself, remained unpublished until 1954. There has been some speculation that 
the publication was discouraged at the time by Heidegger, who was professor in 
Marburg as of 1921 and who was familiar with Natorp's latest developments.2o 
In fact, Natorp's last intuitions, which focused on the simple and original fact of 
being simply being - the basic factum of the " es gibt" - bear some resemblance 
to Heidegger's Seinsfrage. 
The most important and also most influential individual for twentieth-
century philosophy stemming from the Marburg School was undoubtedly Ernst 
Cassirer. He ingeniously picked up the main lines from his teachers Cohen and 
Natorp, weaving them into his own philosophical system, while incorporating 
18. Cf., for example, Christoph Von Wolzogen, Die Autonome Relation: Zum Problem der 
Beziehung im Spatwerk Paul Natorps; Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte der Theorien der Relation 
(Wiirzburg and Amsterdam: Rodopi, 1984), who also lists examples of such readings (von 
Wolzogen himself reads Natorp in this Heideggerian manner as well). 
19. Helmut Holzhey's Cohen und Natorp (Basel and Stuttgart: Schwabe, 1986) does an excellent 
job at shOwing where the differences between Cohen and Natorp lay. 
20. Cf. von Wolzogen, Die Autonome Relation, who lists some quotations from Heidegger's corre· 
spondence in support of this hypothesis. It would be, ironically, Gadamer, pupil of both 
Natorp and Heidegger, who later favored the publication of this text, as witnessed by his 
laudatory introduction "Paul Natorp:' in Natorp, Philosophische Systematik, xi-xviii. 
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influences from such diverse fields as linguistics, anthropology, and other 
("hard") sciences, such as contemporary physics. He was the most original and 
also most prolific offspring of the Marburg School. Coming from a wealthy 
family, he neither aspired to be a university professor, nor were his chances as 
a Jew ever very good in German academia at the time. Nevertheless, he was 
considered one of the strongest of his generation, earning his first recognition 
as a historian of philosophy through his studies on Leibniz and Renaissance 
and early modern thought. He was also involved in new editions of the works 
of Leibniz and Kant. His monograph, Kant's Leben und Lehre (Kant's Life and 
Thought), originally intended as the introductory essay to the Kant edition but 
not published until after the First World War, has become a classic in Kant schol-
arship, while his four-volume Das Erkenntnisproblem in der Philosophie und 
Wissenschaft der Neueren Zeit (The problem of knowledge in modern philos-
ophy and science) is an excellent example of neo-Kantian Problemgeschichte.21 
One would, however, not do justice to his philosophical originality - which 
unfortunately has sometimes been the case - were he to be restricted to his early 
work on the history of philosophy. 
After the First World War, Cassirer did receive a call as professor (Ordinarius) 
to the newly founded university of Hamburg, where he became Rektor (presi-
dent) in 1929-30, the highest academic position that any Jew ever occupied in 
Germany. Quickly reading the signs of the times, he and his extended family 
left Nazi Germany in 1933. Cassirer emigrated first to England, then to Sweden, 
where he fled from the Nazis anew as they invaded that country in 1941. He 
was then invited to a visiting professorship at Yale, where he stayed for three 
years. In 1944, he assumed another visiting appOintment at Columbia. Already 
in failing health and highly distressed by the war reports, he died of a heart 
attack on the streets of New York in 1945, shortly before the end of the Second 
World War. It has been speculated that his influence, especially in the US, would 
have been considerably stronger had he lived to see his original work, published 
in German and only slowly becoming translated, come to fruition in the New 
World.22 
Sometimes referred to as a watershed event in twentieth -century philosophy, 
the famous encounter between Cassirer and Heidegger in the Swiss town of 
Davos in 1929 must be mentioned. 23 During the annually held Hochschultage 
21. See the section on Problemgeschichte below. 
22. Cf. Michael Friedman, "Ernst Cassirer;' Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2004 (http:// 
plato.stanford.edu/ entries/ cassirer). 
23. There is a smattering of literature on this event, beginning - at least in recent scholarship -
with Michael Friedman, A Parting of the Ways: Carnap, Cassirer, and Heidegger (Chicago, IL: 
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devoted to intellectual topics - in 1929, Kant's philosophy and its interpreta-
tiOl} - Heidegger and Cassirer conducted a well-attended dispute regarding their 
different interpretations of Kant's philosophy. In truth, it amounted to a show-
down between the two most prominent philosophers of the time: Heidegger, who 
had just published his groundbreaking Being and Time (1927); and Cassirer, who 
had just published the third volume of his philosophical system, the voluminous 
Philosophy of Symbolic Forms. While formally centering on the interpretation of 
Kant, the dispute was really about what, according to each, ought be considered 
the main purpose and intention of philosophy at large: for Cassirer, liberating 
the human being from his confinement in primitive and un-enlightened exis-
tence; for Heidegger, bringing human Dasein back into the "harshness and hard-
ness of fate." Given the events that would ensue in Germany in 1933, Heidegger's 
role in them, and the fascist ideology the German people came to embrace - the 
country of the Dichter und Denker - it is not hard to see the wider and more 
profound implications of this encounter.24 This is not to say that these implica-
tions were clear at the time to those in the audience. However, in hindsight, this 
encounter bears an almost eerie premonition of what was to come. The reasons 
why contemporaries believed that Cassirer had been so thoroughly bested by 
Heidegger cannot be spelled out straightforwardly either, but can perhaps best be 
described as "atmosphericaI:' While the participants of the conference spent all 
day indoors debating, and dressed formally for the evening reception, Heidegger 
spent the days (presumably when he was not part of the program) skiing and 
showed up at the reception in his ski overalls, in total disregard of social etiquette. 
The "hardness of being" of the young and energetic Heidegger clashed against the 
bourgeois Cassirer, who seemed to be "in agr~ement with everything:'25 implying 
weak compromises reminiscent of the politics of the Weimar Republic, which 
compromised itself out of existence. 
Regarding Cassirer's character, it has been described as conciliatory and 
"Olympian:' which extends to his writings. These display a remarkable lucidity 
and, at the same time, philosophical modesty. At times the philosophical core of 
his argument can be lost in the wealth of historical erudition that accompanies 
24. This dispute is published as "Davos Disputation Between Ernst Cassirer and Martin Hei-
degger;' in Martin Heidegger, Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics, Richard Taft (trans.) 
(Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1997). For important essays on this encounter, 
see Dominic Kaegi and Enno Rudolph (eds) , Cassirer-Heidegger: 70 Jahre Davoser Disputa-
tion (Hamburg: Felix Meiner, 2000). Among those who travelled to Davos to witness this 
encounter were Rudolf Carnap, Eugen Fink, Herbert Marcuse, Joachim Ritter, Leo Strauss, 
Leon Brunschvicg, Emmanuel Levinas, Jean Cavailles, and Maurice de Gandillac. 
25. In a telling anecdote, reported in Gordon, "Neo-Kantianism and the Politics of Enlightenment;' 
223ff., students put on a mock debate between Heidegger and Cassirer one evening. Cassirer 
was played by the young Levinas, who supposedly let flour (= dust) trickle out of his sleeves, 
repeating the phrase "Ich bin mit all em einverstanden" (I agree with everything). 
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his accounts. Most of his writings focus on other thinkers and their theories, 
and he is content to raise philosophical issues in those contexts. Cassirer's first 
original contribution to critical philosophy, which came fairly late in this young 
shooting star's career, was his Substanz- und Funktionsbegriff (Substance and 
Function),26 which appears to discuss a seemingly remote problem in scientific 
concept formation, but in fact raises an issue that will be the cornerstone of his 
philosophical systematic: the distinction between a substantial and functional 
ontology and its epistemological implications. This basic insight, stemming from 
the groundwork laid by Cohen, was cashed out in his three-volume Philosophy 
oj Symbolic Forms. In addition to these substantial tomes, Cassirer wrote the 
four-volume study The Problem of Knowledge in Modern Philosophy and a wide 
array of articles and smaller studies on mythology, linguistics, modern physics, 
and intellectual history. Once in the United States, he summarized his system 
in the popular book An Essay on Man (written in English). His last work, The 
Myth oj the State, offers a penetrating critique of modern fascism based on his 
interpretation of the role of myth in the hierarchy of cultural achievements and 
its relation to modern totalitarianism. 
Returning to his first systematic work, Substance and Function, Cassirer, 
taking his cue from Cohen's paradigm of construction, traced the constructive 
activity of the human mind in the distinction between substantive and func-
tional concepts in scientific nomenclature. Opposed to a substantial paradigm 
in which, following Aristotle's substance ontology, concepts mirror things as 
substances, a new type of concept formation has taken hold in modernity: that 
of functional concepts. Functional concepts place the objects that they mirror 
into a junction, as in mathematical functions (j(x». What functional concepts 
mirror, then, are not substantial things, but functions, that is relations. Being 
a function means that the functional concept formation actually constructs the 
object of a particular scientific endeavor. Hence, Cassirer discovered Cohen's 
constructive principle at the heart of scientific concept formation itself. 
Whereas Substance and Function is largely a historical and programmatic 
work, drawing on critical reflections on late-nineteenth-century physics and 
mathematics by Richard Dedekind (1831-1916), Pierre Duhem (1861 - 1916), 
Hermann von Helmholtz (1821-94), and Heinrich Hertz (1857-94) as evidence 
for the core theme of functional concept formation, Cassirer subsequently 
wrote two monographs analyzing the revolutionary physical theories of the 
first half of the twentieth century - general relativity and quantum mechanics 
- as manifestations of this new mode of concept formation. Zur Einstein'schen 
26. Published in English with a translation of his Zur Einstein'schen Relativitatstheorie, in 
Substance and Function and Einstein's Theory of Relativity, William Curtis Swabey & Marie 
Collins Swabey (eds) (New York: Dover, 1953). 
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Reiativitiitstheorie (1920; published in English as "On Einstein's Theory of 
Relativity: Considered from the Epistemological Standpoint" as a supplement 
to Substance and Function) identified the postulate of general covariance - that 
the laws of physics are the same in all reference frames, hence that the objects 
of fundamental physics must be represented as tensor expressions, valid in all 
coordinate systems - as a novel principle of objectifying unity, a significant 
further step away from anthropomorphic thing concepts toward an abstract 
and purely geometrical concept of object. Cassirer's epistemological examina-
tion of quantum mechanics, Determinism and Indeterminism in Modern Physics, 
written while in exile in Sweden in 1936, points to Heisenberg's uncertainty 
relations and quantum statistics as even more striking transformations of the 
concept of object, where the old classical notions of physical state and individual 
identity are transformed, acquiring functional form. The thrust of each of these 
two works is an insistence that the concept of object in physics is subordinate 
to that of physical law, and accordingly that "objectivity or objective reality, is 
attained only because and insofar as there is conformity to law - not vice versa:'27 
But this was only Cassirer's first step. For, Cassirer asserted, such a construc-
tive activity is not present just in scientific concept formation - an activity of 
the human spirit, to be sure - but in all cultural activities. Construction is, in 
other words, a form of interpretation of something that could be completely 
different depending on the manner in which it is constructed. The sine curve 
(Cassirer's example) in the mathematical context is, in an artistic manner of 
seeing, an ornament, and may represent any number of other contexts. Prior to 
such an interpretation - any interpretation - the thing is simply nothing for us. 
What a thing is depends on its context, and th~ context is something constructed 
through the human mind. Cassirer calls the agent of this activity spirit. That 
which is constructed, or the medium of construction, he calls, nodding to 
Kant's "Transcendental Aesthetic;' a form. There is no simple object given (as 
a substance or substratum) that then receives a supervening interpretation, but 
there are only objects-in-contexts. There is no "raw" datum. The term for such 
an object within a form Cassirer takes over from his favorite author, Goethe, 
in calling it a symbol. Cassirer therefore calls his system that of sy mbolic forms. 
They are the forms of manifestation into which human spirit's activity becomes 
27. Ernst Cassirer, Determinism and Indeterminism in Modern PhysiCS: Historical and Systematic 
Studies of the Problem of Causality, O. Theodor Benfey (trans.) (New Haven, CT: Yale 
University Press, [1936J 1956), 132. By showing that there is continuous progress toward 
pure Signification in the process of objectification in physics, this book also rebuked the Nazis' 
characterization of relativity and quantum physics as "Jewish" and "degenerate" science. The 
authors would like to thank Thomas Ryckman for his suggestions on how to treat this issue. 
Interested readers should consult Ryckman's The Reign of Relativity: Philosophy in Physics 
1915-1925 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005) . 
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filled. Indeed, we live in a plurality of meaningful "contexts:' The three symbolic 
forms that Cassirer discusses in his magnum opus are language, myth, and scien-
tific cognition. They are products of human spirit's productive-constructive 
activity. His adaptation of the transcendental method traces the manner of 
construction in each form, respectively, while breaking with Cohen's exclusively 
scientific-logistic paradigm. The modes of construction in each form are more 
freely described as different "logics" inhering in them. Cassirer's system can also 
be described as a methodology of symbolic formation; thus, he is decidedly a 
methodological pluralist. But his methodological pluralism is incomprehen-
sible without the fundamental constructive paradigm that is the signature of 
the "Marburg Method:' 
Owing to his systematizing work in describing symbolic formation in 
different cultural contexts, his writings have become influential for several 
sciences, both human (anthropology, linguistics, aesthetics) and natural (such 
as physics). Before leaving Cassirer, a brief comment on his interpretation of 
fascism is in order. The Myth of the State rivals other classical texts dealing with 
fascism in the twentieth century. In his interpretation of the rise of fascism in 
the twentieth century, he argues that the phenomenon of fascism is the result 
of political propaganda that has allowed myth to re-enter the political arena, 
making porous the borders between responsible, rational action and mythical 
power. Myth, once overcome by Greek enlightenment, raises its ugly head once 
political discourse has become corrupted in a manner that allows mythical 
elements - Hitler, the "divine Fuhrer;' the myth of the superior ''Aryan Race;' 
and so on - to dominate political, democratic discourse. 
The Southwest School: Wilhelm Windelband, Heinrich Rickert, Emil Lask 
The Southwest School is much less cohesive than the Marburg School; even 
the name "Southwest" indicates that this "movement" (to speak of a school is 
perhaps exaggerated) was localized in different university towns - Heidelberg 
and Freiburg im Breisgau, respectively.28 The main representatives were Wilhelm 
Windelband (1848-1915) and his pupil Heinrich Rickert (1863-1936) . An 
important member of this movement was Emil Lask (1875-1915), arguably the 
most interesting but also most difficult philosopher of this group and of signifi-
cant influence for, among others, the young Heidegger. He died prematurely, 
however, in the trenches during the First World War. His "logic of philosophy" 
is a metaphilosophical category system for philosophy itself that, while highly 
28. The Southwest School is sometimes also referred to as the "Baden School" after the state of 
Baden, part of the German Empire; the state was incorporated after the Second World War 
and is now called "Baden-Wiirttemberg:' 
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original, is arguably a departure from neo-Kantianism in its Southwest mode 
and will not receive further discussion here. 29 
The Southwesterners were quite successful at their respective universities and 
shaped several generations of students. Windelband, for instance, was professor 
in Zurich, Freiburg, and Strasbourg (then German territory), before settling into 
Heidelberg, where he lived from 1903 until his death. Rickert became professor 
in Freiburg in 1896 before receiving a call to Heidelberg in 1916 to succeed 
Windelband, who had died the year before. Despite a mental illness that prohib-
ited Rickert from making public appearances (he suffered from agoraphobia), he 
nevertheless exerted a substantial influence through his - often polemical and 
piercing - writings.3o While more loosely affiliated than the Marburg School, 
Rickert and Windelband nevertheless worked with certain core ideas that they 
. shared, while not at all times agreeing in all details. Since their philosophical 
efforts displayed less of a systematic progression than the work of the members 
of the Marburg School, we shall be presenting the Southwest School in terms of 
their shared core ideas.3l 
(i) Writing the history of philosophy as a history of problems (Problemgeschichte) 
Windelband, while best known as a historian of philosophy, is unfairly reduced 
to a historian insofar as he devised a new way of doing the history of philos-
ophy, namely as the history of problems. While this might seem inconsequential 
today, to understand the history of philosophy as a development of philosophical 
problems was at the time quite innovative. Win del band's historiological method 
took the emphasis away from individual philosophers and a quasi-biographical 
reconstruction of their work and placed that emphasis instead on the rich histor-
ical "horizon" that provided a historical-scientific-philosophical setting in 
which these philosophers worked. This setting is the process in which "European 
humanity" exposes its view of world and life (Welt- und Lebensauffassung). It is 
not a Hegelian scenario, in which history is the process of increasing knowledge 
of freedom, but rather a process in which thinkers and scientists communicate 
and interact. In this historical process, there are relevant factors that need to 
29. For an excellent treatment of Lask, see Steven Galt Crowell, Husserl, Heidegger, and the Space 
of Meaning: Paths Towards Transcendental Phenomenology (Evanston, IL: Northwestern 
University·Press,2001). 
30. Rickert's reputation at the time indicates the Significance of the acknowledgment given to the 
phenomenological movement when Husserl received the call to Freiburg in 1916 to succeed 
Rickert. 
3l. While the members of the Southwest School were no less respected in German academia 
than the Marburgers, their philosophical legacy has dwindled to nearly zero insofar as their 
achievements have become so much a part of the received idea of philosophical work that 
they can well be considered trivial. 
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be taken into account: pragmatic, cultural, and individual ones. A pragmatic 
consideration of the history of problems emphasizes that the same philosophical 
problems re-emerge throughout Western history in changed circumstances. The 
cultural aspect means that culture is the binding continuum that holds together 
seemingly incoherent scientific or philosophical discussions. And finally, the 
focus on individuality highlights the importance of individual characters in 
the history of philosophy. While this was the primary focus in earlier philo-
sophical historiography, for the neo-Kantians this consideration now comes at 
the end of this historical reconstruction.32 This type of philosophical historiog-
raphy - in conjunction with the meticulous work that neo-Kantian philosophers 
carried out in their editing of the original sources - has become the standard 
for any historical writings in philosophy. It has also been the target of attempts 
to provide alternative ways of doing the history of philosophy, and Heidegger's 
"History of Being" and Gadamer's "History of Effects"33 - both Heidegger and 
Gadamer knew this neo-Kantian method intimately - should be seen as direct 
critiques of the neo-Kantian method of doing history of philosophy. 
(ii) Distinctions in theory of science: idiographiC and nomothetic sciences 
Perhaps the most famous legacy of the Southwest School is Windelband's 
distinction between idiographic and nomothetic sciences, that is, between a 
science of the individual and singular and a science of the general and lawlike. 34 
Win del band lays out this influential distinction, at the height of his career, in 
his famous Presidential Address (Rektoratsrede) in Strasbourg in 1894.35 His 
starting-point is a critique of the traditional distinction between rational and 
empirical sciences. This distinction is no longer satisfactory; indeed, the devel-
opment of certain sciences - most notoriously psychology and physics - has 
shown that the true results of these disciplines are neither purely rational nor 
purely empirical. An overview of the scientific activities of his day reveals a 
different distinction that seems to better fit the actual status quo, namely that 
between sciences of nature (Naturwissenschaften) and sciences of the human 
world (Geisteswissenschaften, sometimes also translated as "human" or "spir-
itual sciences;' or nowadays simply "humanities"). They are both sciences 
32. Cf. Holzhey, "Der Neukantianismus;' 59-60. 
*33. This aspect of Gadamer's work is discussed in the essay by Wayne J. Froman in The History oj 
Continental Philosophy: Volume 6. 
34. Rickert expanded on this distinction and added some further details, but he was in general 
agreement with Windelband's line of thought. Although one reads time and again that this 
idiographic- nomothetic distinction was introduced by Rickert, it is Windelband, however, 
who conceived it. 
35. Windelband, "Geschichte und Naturwissenschaft;' in Priiludien: AuJsatze und Reden zur 
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- Wiss~nschaJten - peculiar to the English ear, meaning, literally translated, 
"knowledge-doms:' Such a distinction undercuts that of rational and empir-
ical sciences and is indeed an advance over it. But such a distinction, although 
widely acknowledged in Windelband's day, rests on ontological assumptions 
concerning the ontic regions of nature and spirit that present a problem. The 
science that reveals the problem with this distinction is psychology: what kind 
of science is one to group it under? As it has the human psyche as its object, one 
would be inclined to call it a human science. Yet insofar as its goal is experimen-
tally verifiable general results, it has the character of a natural science. 
Here Windelband intervenes with an attempt to undercut this distinc-
tion. Arguing that all sciences, insofar as they treat objects of experience, are 
empirical, the only questions are how and as what to interpret these empirically 
ascertained results. This new distinction between how and as what is not an 
ontological one, but - in good Kantian fashion - a methodological one. The 
focal points of cognition are, generally, the individual or the general. Both are, 
however, not absolute but merely relative terms. Scientific cognition oscillates 
between these extreme focal points when interpreting its findings . The scientific 
cognition of something individual Windelband calls idiographic (Le. describing 
the individual, singular), that of something general, nomothetic (i.e. positing 
the general, lawlike). "The latter are sciences of laws [GesetzeswissenschaJten], 
the former are sciences of events [EreigniswissenschaJten]; the latter teach what 
is always the case, the former what occurred only once:'36 For instance, if one 
wants to, as a historian, work on the French Revolution, one has to describe 
the individual characters and individual events that took place, and so on. On 
the other hand, if one wants to understand, as a chemist, the manner in which 
certain chemicals react together, one has to find out the general laws by which 
they function and react - always and in a reliable, repeatable pattern. But neither 
rests on an ontological premise. Indeed, the nomothetic and idiographic stan-
dards can be applied to one and the same ontic field. The classic example for this, 
according to Windelband, is the science of organic nature: 
As systematics, it is of nomothetic character, insofar as it describes 
the always fixed types of living creatures, which have been experi-
enced within the millennia of human observation as their lawlike 
form. As developmental history, where it presents the order of earthly 
organisms as a process of descent and transformation of species [i.e. 
in evolutionary theory] ' " there it is an idiographic discipline.37 
36. Ibid. , 145. 
37. Ibid., 146. 
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This distinction stakes out a new type of science in the wake of the positivistic 
predicament that was rampant at the end of the nineteenth century, according 
to which naturalism was the method for all sciences. Contrary to the notion that 
human "disciplines" cannot be sciences precisely because they yield no general 
results, Windelband emphasized that the human sciences can indeed have the 
character of science with no less dignity than natural science if one has a different 
scientific ideal. The idiographic sciences have no less importance for the under-
standing of our world; indeed, ifby "world" we mean not nature but culture, the 
idiographic sciences are more important. Windelband's distinction was, in effect, 
an assertion of the importance of a genuine "science of culture" over the reduced 
notion of science as Wissenschaft in the sense of "natural science:' 
As plausible as Windelband's distinction might seem, it was the focus of criti-
cisms from, among others, Dilthey and Husserl, both of whom, albeit for different 
reasons, rejected this distinction when it came to describing the proper object of 
the human sciences. For Dilthey, a description of human historical development 
need not be only idiographic, but instead could posit types of worldviews and 
typical character forms (i.e. types, not laws), and hence need not have to choose 
between individual and universal accounts.38 And Husserl's attempt at an eidetic 
science of subjectivity goes even further, asserting the possibility of a "rigorous" 
(Le. a priori) science of subjectivity after the transcendental-phenomenological 
reduction. Finally, Heidegger's sketch of a hermeneutic of factical Dasein is pred-
icated on a wholesale rejection of the (Platonic) distinction between the indi-
vidual and the universal that underlies Windelband's account. Here again we 
see that the influence of neo-Kantianism on twentieth-century philosophy is ex 
negativo, as the seminal philosophers mentioned here derive their methodolog-
ical paradigms from a rejection of this Windelbandian distinction. 
(iii) Philosophy as value theory 
The idea of an idiographic science as the proper method of accessing the life of 
spirit or human culture was cashed out especially in Rickert's work. Radicalizing 
Windelband, instead of seeing idiographic and nomothetic sciences as equally 
viable methods for cognition, Rickert privileges the idiographic over the nomo-
thetic sciences. Informed by Rudolf Hermann Lotze's philosophy of value
39 
- Lotze alleges that Plato's ideas ought properly to be conceived as valid values -
Rickert asserts in his influential work Der Gegenstand der Erkenntnis (The object 
*38. See the discussion of Dilthey in the essay by Eric Sean Nelson in The History of Continel1tal 
Philosophy: Volume 2. 
39. Rudolf Hermann Lotze (181 7-8 1) was one of the leading German philosophers of the second 
half of the nineteenth century. A specialist in logiC and philosophy of biology (he completed a 
medical degree along with his philosophy degree at Leipzig in 1838), he taught at Giittingen 
for almost forty years, beginning in 1844. 
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of cognition; first published in 1891 and re-edited six times, each time vastly 
reworked) that all cognition is in essence a form of valuing. Accepting Kant's 
thesis of the primacy of practical reason, this primacy asserts itself, according 
to Rickert, already in the field of cognition insofar as cognizing is not a passive 
apprehending but a forming of the object of cognition as something to be inte-
grated into culture, that is, the world of values. At stake, for Rickert, is nothing 
less than a redefinition of the traditional task of epistemology. The object that 
is represented in cognition is not something independent of its being cognized, 
but is something that is beingformed by the subject. Transcendent reality, which 
to Kant was always mind-independent, is therefore dependent on the cultur-
. ally creative subject. This, concomitantly, changes the traditional notion of the 
cognizing subject as "we must form a different notion of the cognizing subject 
as only representing consciousness and, consequently, also a different notion 
of the object and the measure of cognition as that of a transcendent reality. "40 
Given these two poles of cognition, one can approach the problem from both 
the subjective and objective sides. The subjective path leads to a transcendental 
psychology, the objective one to a transcendental logic; both are disciplines 
within transcendental philosophy. However, the empirical approach to the object 
of cognition remains valid in the empirical sciences; Rickert thus maps Kant's 
idealism-realism distinction onto that of philosophy and the empirical sciences. 
This dual approach is Rickert's restatement of Kant's transcendental idealism. 
In his second famous work, Die Grenzen der Naturwissenschaftlichen 
Begriffsbildung (The limits of concept formation in natural science; first published 
in 1896), Rickert expands on the epistemological foundations while also drawing 
from Windelband's idiographic-nomothetic dist~nction. As the title indicates, 
concept formation in the natural sciences has limitations. It leads, if pursued to 
its extreme, into a purely naturalistic worldview. Contrary to Windelband, who 
considered both idiographic and nomothetic forms of scientific research to be 
on a relative scale (Le. their difference was only a matter of degree), Rickert 
emphasizes the fundamental difference between them and goes on to favor the 
idiographic method. Nomothetic research winds up in a dangerous abstrac-
tion that threatens to cover up or make obsolete the historical life of culture 
(here anticipating Husserl's famous critique of the mathematization of science 
in The Crisis of the European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology). 
This is the negative part of this work. The positive is Rickert's description of 
the inner functioning of the human or cultural sciences. What makes them 
distinctly scientific in their own right is that they establish a relation to supra-
individual values. Values, to Rickert, are neither physical nor mental, but are 
40. Heinrich Rickert, Der Gegenstand der Erkenntnis: Einfiihrung in die Transzendentalphilosophie 
(Tiibingen: MohrlSiebeck, [1892J 1928),2. 
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"located" in an altogether different "third realm;'41 where entities do not exist 
but hold valid (gelten). This realm is ontologically distinct from either the phys-
ical or the mental insofar as they both are forms of being, while the ontological 
status of values is their validity. Cultural scientific judgments, then, are charac-
terized by making reference to this "world" of values. Hence the peculiarity of 
cultural scientific work is not primarily that it focuses on the individual - this 
is, as it were, taken for granted - but instead that in this individual attention it 
makes a connection to an independently existing realm of valuesY This realm, 
moreover, is in itself systematically organized. Correct cultural as well as moral 
judgments can be discerned in their adequacy to the systematic hierarchy and 
order of values. Cultural or spiritual sciences are expressions of the ideal order 
of values. Therefore, the task of philosophy is to draft and describe this ideal 
system of values. In his later years, Rickert drafted a "system of values" based on 
the distinction of six different fields of values: logic, aesthetics, mysticism, ethics, 
the erotic, and philosophy of religion.43 The true meaning of transcendental 
philosophy is thus redeemed in this draft of a system of values. Rickert began 
composing this sketch in his System der Philosophie (System of philosophy), of 
which only volume one appeared, and which has remained - despite Rickert's 
reputation in Germany at the time -largely ignored.44 
II. NEO-KANTIANISM IN FRANCE 
French neo-Kantianism emerged as the result of a conjunction of events 
including the demise of Victor Cousin's eclecticism under the "authoritarian" 
first period of the Second Empire (1851-60) and the development of spiritu-
alism45 under the "liberal" second period of the Empire. As a result of a very 
dense network of friendships, the extreme centralization of political power, and 
41. Rickert also calls this realm - much earlier than 1933! - das Dritte Reich . the "Third Reich:' 
I just mention this in order to clear up any confusion on the part of a stumped reader. The 
term was not exclUSively used by the neo-Kantians; for instance. it was also used - in the same 
sense - by Frege. 
42. In connecting the individual human being to the universal realm of values. Rickert is close to 
Cassirer's cultural anthropology. which defines the human being as a cultural being precisely 
in its capacity to lift itself out of the realm of nature and to become part of the world of spirit. 
which is intersubjective and universal. 
43. Cf. Ollig. Der Neukantianismus. 63 . 
44. For a late recognition of Rickert's systematic philosophy. see Christian Krijnen. Nachmeta-
physischer Sinn: Eine Problemgeschichtliche und Systematische Studie zu den Prinz ipien der 
Wertphilosophie Heinrich Rickerts (Wiirzburg: Konigshausen & Neumann. 2001) . 
' 45. "French Spiritualist Philosophy" is discussed in the essay by F. C. T. Moore in The History of 
Continental Philosophy: Volume 2. 
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influential universities such as the Ecole Normale Superieure (ENS) and the 
Sorbonne, neo-Kantianism became the predominant philosophical trend in 
French academia under Victor Duruy's tenure as minister of education (1863-
69). Charles Renouvier (1815-1903) and Jules Lachelier (1832-1918) initiated 
this trend, establishing two general and distinct forms that were never unified.46 
Renouvier's works offer a system divided into the classical divisions of general 
and formal logic, rational psychology, and principles of natureY In his Essais de 
critique generale (Essays in general critique), he writes: "I frankly confess that'r 
follow in Kant's footsteps:'48 This Kantian program is described in general terms: 
"the analysis and the coordination of the principles of knowledge in general, and 
46. The best studies of French philosophy between 1850 and 1930 are Isaac Benrubi, Contemporary 
Thought of France, Ernest B. Dicker (trans.) (London: Williams & Norgate, 1926), and Michel 
Espagne, En defa du Rhin: L'Allemagne des philosophes franfais au XIXe siecie (Paris: Editions 
du Cerf, 2004). In English, John Alexander Gunn, Modern French Philosophy: A Study of the 
Development since Comte (London: T. F. Unwin, 1922), has some interesting inSights but, as 
Bergson noted, lacks a clear and firm guiding thread. The translation of Benrubi, Les Sources 
et les courants de la philosophie contemporaine en France (Paris: Felix Alcan, 1933), seems to 
be based on a shorter and schematic German version. Gary Gutting, French Philosophy in the 
Twentieth Century (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), although interesting, is 
very partial, uses arguable classifications, and contains many inaccuracies: although different 
forms of Kantianism are mentioned, there is no analysis of the exchanges with Germany, a 
conceptually, institutionally, and politically essential point. Renouvier is not a spiritualist, he 
did not study at the ENS with Ravaisson, but was a student at the Ecole Polytechnique, an 
important element for his scientific background and his relation to positivism, since this is 
how he met Comte. Hegel was indeed translated before the middle of the twentieth century: 
Charles Benard translated the Lectures on Aesthetics in 1855, Augusto Vera's translation of 
the Encyclopaedia was published from 1859 to 1869, a fact that should be added to the file 
regarding Cousin's essential relation to Hegel, as well as Hippolyte Taine's. In Twentieth-
Century French Philosophy: Key Themes and Thinkers (Malden, MA: Blackwell, 2006), Schrift's 
description of how the French system of education functions is fundamental and unique 
in English. Vincent Descombes, Modern French Philosophy, L. Scott-Fox and J. M. Harding 
(trans.) (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980) offers a witty picture of the latter 
trends in French philosophy (structuralisms, essentially), although the subtlety of the analysis 
as well as its irony may make it a difficult read for the unadvised reader. 
47. On Renouvier, see Laurent Fedi, Le Probleme de la connaissance dans la philosophie de Ch. 
Renouvier (Paris: L'Harmattan, 1999); Octave Hamelin, Le Systeme de Renouvier (Paris: J. 
Vrin, 1927); William Logue, Charles Renouvier, Philosopher of Liberty (Baton Rouge, LA: 
Louisiana State University Press, 1993). For Renouvier's conception of science and use of the 
hypothesis, cf. Warren Schmaus, "Kant's Reception in France: Theories of the Categories in 
Academic Philosophy, Psychology and Social Sciences;' Perspective on Science 11(1) (2003). 
Schmaus's "Renouvier and the Method of Hypothesis;' Studies in History and Philosophy of 
Science 38 (2007), is also iI\teresting concerning the kind of neo-Kantianism that developed in 
France, and the typically neo-Kantian and phenomenological problem of the Kategorienlehre 
(doctrine of categories). 
48. Charles Renouvier, Essais de critique gemirale (Paris: Lagrange, 1854-64), xv. Hereafter quota-
tions from this foreword will be cited parenthetically by page number. Unless otherwise 
mentioned, all translations from the French are my own. 
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of those that the established sciences put at their foundations without making 
them explicit" (xx). The principles to which Renouvier refers are construed 
as fundamental a priori relations that constitute knowledge. Starting with 
the concept of representation in a very broad sense, Renouvier untangles its 
elements and the laws ruling knowledge. He is thereby led to rewrite the Kantian 
system of categories. 
The Kantian inspiration is clear, and the influence of the forewords to the 
Critique of Pure Reason, in particular that of the second edition, is obvious. The 
question of the scientificity of philosophy is the guiding thread: "It is impos-
sible to reasonably reject the Critique. For it is inspired by the spirit of science; 
it is that very spirit" (xii). For Renouvier, as for Kant, the Critique is opposed to 
traditional metaphysics, which was informed by theology and cosmology. As 
will soon be the case for the German neo-Kantians, Renouvier sees the Critique's 
scientific character in its methodological dimension: "If the result of the Critiq ue 
is to formulate a method, to provide a lasting logic, this is indeed very much; 
it is almost enough for its scientificity" (xiii). But a notable difference between 
Renouvier and the German neo-Kantians, especially the Marburg School, is that 
for Renouvier it is not so much that the Critique as such is the method (as Kant 
wrote in the B Foreword); rather, the method is the result of the Critique (namely, 
the ensuing Kantian methodologies themselves). 
Nevertheless, Renouvier is quite critical of Kant. His last book, Critique de la 
doctrine de Kant (Critique of the Kantian doctrine), offers a systematic decon-
struction of the Critique of Pure Reason. In Renouvier's idealism, as, arguably, 
in the Marburg School's idealism, the return to Leibniz49 is nearly as important 
as the return to Kant.50 But the very essence of Renouvier's concept of the tran-
scendental remains deficient and psychological when compared to that found in 
more elaborate Kant interpretations, as well as in the main German neo-Kantian 
schools and Husserl's phenomenology. 
Renouvier never taught and was extremely prolific. His influence was felt, 
however, only after 1867, the year he founded, with his friend Franyois Pilion, 
the journal L'Annee philosophique (The philosophical yearbook). At that time 
49. In 1899, Renouvier published his La Nouvelle monadologie. A Leibnizian reconstruction 
of Kant relies on a long history, going back to Salomon Maimon's interpretation of Kant's 
Anticipations of Perception as an unconscious sum of "petites perceptions:' Cohen's rejection 
of sensitive intuition relies on a similar conception. It is here important because in French 
neo-Kantianism, and particularly in the philosophy of mathematics, it will give birth to a 
strong opposition between the Kantian philosophy of intuition (Boutroux, Poincare) and the 
Leibnizian philosophy of the concept (Couturat, Cavailles). 
50. This is a reason, among others, that it caught the attention of Cassirer; cf. Ernst Cassi rer, "Oas 
Problem des Unendlichen und Renouviers 'Gesetz der Zahl:" in Philosophische Abhandlungen: 
Hermann Cohen zum 70. Geburtstag Dargebracht (Berlin: Bruno Cassirer, 1912), and "Review 
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he started to have followers: Fran<;:ois Evellin, the young Victor Brochard, Jean-
Jacques Gourd, and his main disciple, Octave HamelinY It is also during this 
period that William James carefully read his work. 
If Renouvier's neo-Kantianism can be described as a neocriticism insofar as 
it submits Kant himself to critique, Lachelier's can be described as a late evolu-
tion of spiritualism. His teacher, Felix Ravaisson (18l3-1900), established an 
intellectual and institutional strain that would develop into Bergson's spiritu-
alism as well as Emile Boutroux's neo-Kantianism. Ravaisson favored Schelling 
over Hegel, a preference that meant, in the French context, leaping over Cousin 
to return to Maine de Biran. True idealism is a spiritualism grounded in the 
will. Lachelier depicted, quite accurately, the intellectual situation framed by 
Ravaisson's Report (1868). As he writes in a letter to Paul Janet, on December 
8,1891: 
It is Ravaisson, I believe, who taught us all to conceive being not as 
objective forms of substances or phenomena, but as the subjective 
form of spiritual action, this action being - in its last resort - thought 
or will. I think you could find this idea in Bergson, in Ribot even, 
as well as in Boutroux and myself. It is perhaps the only trait that is 
common to all of us and that makes for the unity of the philosophical 
movement of the last twenty years. 52 
With such a common ground, how can one account for the fragmentation of 
spiritualism into Christian philosophy, Bergsonism, and neo-Kantianism? 
51. Victor Brochard's (1848-1907) doctoral dissertation, De l'erreur (Paris, 1879), claims the 
influence of Kant and Renouvier. This is also the case for Franc;:ois Evellin's (1835-1910) 
dissertation: lnfini et quantite (Paris: Germer Bailliere, 1880). Jean-Jacques Gourd (1850-
1909) was one of Renouvier's followers in Switzerland (see his Le Phenomene [Paris: Felix 
Alcan, 1888]). Octave Hamelin (I856-1907), the most prominent of Renouvier's followers, 
first exerted his influence by teaching at the University of Bordeaux (1884-1903), at the ENS 
(1903-7), and at the Sorbonne (1905-7). His acclaimed book, Essai sur les elements principaux 
de la representation (Paris: Felix Alcan, 1907; doctoral thesis), as well as his translation and 
commentary of Aristotle Physics II (complementary dissertation) were published the year of 
his death. Leon Robin, his student and another of the Sorbonne's major figures, published 
two thick volumes of Hamelin's lectures: Le Systeme de Descartes (Paris: Felix Alcan, 1911 ; 
with a foreword by Hamelin's friend Emile Durkheim), and Le Systeme d'Aristote (Paris: Felix 
Alcan, 1920; lectures given at the ENS in 1904-5). Indicative of his importance, other courses 
were later published, including Le Systeme de Renouvier (Sorbonne, 1906-7), Les Philosophes 
presocratiques (Strasbourg: Association des publications de l'universite de Strasbourg, 1978; 
lectures 1905-6), and Fichte (Strasbourg: Presses Universitaires de Strasbourg, 1988; lectures 
1887). 
52. Jules Lachelier, Lettres, 1856-1918 (Paris: G. Girard, 1933),139. 
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In 1861, Lachelier dissociated himself from Biran and hence from Ravaisson 
as well. 53 His courses on logic and on psychology demonstrate that he had 
already taken a Kantian position when he began teaching at the ENS. He exerted 
his remarkable influence through his lectures rather than through his - relatively 
few - publications. 
The lectures on logic present a general elucidation of the theoretical prin-
ciples of knowledge. From the very first lesson, the method is imbued with 
Kantian elements. "Let me explain: in any science one can differentiate what 
man knows and the way he knows, in other words, matter and form:'54 Both 
in his Lectures on Logic and in the Critique of Pure Reason, Kant had already 
made use of this conceptual distinction between logic in general (which is purely 
formal) and transcendental logic, which is both formal and material. Lachelier's 
lecture course then pursues a Kantian path. To circumscribe science, Lachelier 
takes a detour: "instead of saying in a few words what science is, it might be 
better to review the necessary conditions of science, the degrees spirit covers to 
reach science:'55 This path is very significant, for he borrows the conditions for 
science from the Critique of Pure Reason. The first condition for science is that an 
object is given. Lachelier takes an indirect path to introduce both forms of pure 
intuition, space and time: "the internal world of the successive states in time, 
the outside world of the simultaneous objects in space and also the successive 
states of these same objects in time:'56 Lachelier notes that space is integrated 
in time and, when dissociating the internal world from the external, he also 
intends to make room for that internal world that differs from the internaliza-
tion of the external. A place is therefore reserved for feeling, desire, faith, and so 
on, opening the possibility for the fields of morality and religion, while avoiding 
a reductionist reading of Kant. 
Sensation alone does not explain the possibility of science, since it is reduced 
to an indefinite number of atomistic elements: "impression, in itself, is reduced 
to an infinity of elementary impreSSions that is tied together by nothing and in 
which it vanishes:'57 Knowledge is constituted by a synthetic act of spirit, an 
intellectual synthesis that consists in the positing of pure relations. In addition 
to space and time, pure functions of synthesis are acknowledged as transcen-
dental conditions of science. And when, in the middle of the chapter on induc-
tion, Lachelier intends to ground the determinism expressed by scientific law 
53. Cf. Gaston Mauchaussat, L'Idealisme de Lachelier (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 
1961), 16-40. 
54. Jules Lachelier, Cours de logique, Ecole Normale Superieure 1866-67 (Paris: Editions Univer-
sitaires de France, 1990), 15. 
55. Ibid. 
56. Ibid. 
57 . Ibid., 16. 
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and experimental method such as Claude Bernard58 conceives it, he again refers 
to Kant, correcting the subjectivistic interpretation of the idealism: 
And, although it is attributed to Kant to have reduced the principles 
of understanding to a purely subjective value, it is to him that we 
owe the justification of the principle of determinism. We cannot 
know a priori things in themselves, but we can assert a priori that 
the phenomena of nature, which compose the weft of our thoughts, 
are possible to be thought. And the consciousness of our personal 
identity is the condition of any thought.59 
Moving from the syntheses to individual unity, Lachelier again combines the 
original synthetic unity of apperception, the empirical unity of consciousness, 
and the paralogism of substantiality into one single thought. 
The general method of his reflection, as well as the logical progression within 
these lectures, produce what one can call a transcendental idealism. They sketch 
an outline concerning induction that Lachelier's 1871 dissertation, Du fonde-
ment de l'induction (On the foundation of induction), will further develop; 
regarding determinism, they draw a frame Boutroux will fill, with a few gaps, 
in his dissertation, De la contingence des lois de la nature (On the contingency 
of the laws of nature). 
Neo-Kantianism reached a preeminent position in French philosophy 
through Lachelier's teaching for the following reasons: he was a very char-
ismatic professor; he taught at the ENS from 1864 to 1875; his lectures were 
copied and studied by at least twenty promotions of students,60 some of whom 
in turn became the most influential professors of their time - Boutroux, Liard, 
Paul and Jules Tannery, Janet, Seailles, Brunschvicg.61 And in addition to his 
teaching, Lachelier held important official positions such as the presidency of 
the Agregation, a nationwide competitive examination one needed to take in 
order to teach in higher education, and the general inspector of public education. 
In 1876, not even ten years after Ravaisson's Rapport, Desire Nolen (1838-
1904), in his Inaugural Lecture at the University of Montpellier succeeding 
l 
58. Claude Bernard (1813-78) was a French physiologist. His Introduction a i'etude de La mede-
cine experirnentale (I 865) was universally considered as a classic discourse on the scientific 
method, comparable only to the works of Newton. A professor at the College de France 
from 1847 to 1878, when he died he was given a public funeral, the firs t man of science to be 
awarded that honor in France. 
59. Ibid. , 51; see also 122. 
60. Entering classes in the Ecole Normale are referred to as "promotions:' 
61. Cf. Celestin Bougie, "Spiritualisme et Kantisme en France, Jules Lachelier;' La Revue de Paris 
(May I, 1934), as well as Leon Brunschvicg, Pniface to CEuvres de J. Lachelier (Paris: Felix Alcan, 
1933), xix. 
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Boutroux (another important figure of French neo-Kantianism) , remarked that 
"over the last ten years, it seems that Kant's Critique has become the constant 
and common study of philosophical minds:'62 This, he continued, sets the stage 
for a truly European philosophy.63 Boutroux, in his lectures on Kant delivered 
from 1894 to 1897 and 1900 to 1901 at the Sorbonne, writes: 
moreover, we, the French, have today a closer relationship with Kant's 
philosophy than we had fifty years ago ... . These studies contrib-
uted to the awakening of the metaphysical sense in our country .. .. 
Hence, to go back to Kant is not only to act as a scholar, as a histo-
rian, as a dilettante; it is to draw useful knowledge and forces us to 
face the problems imposed on us [today].64 
Meanwhile Louis Liard (1846-1917),65 a noteworthy neo-Kantian, student of 
Lachelier and friend of Boutroux, had become the director of the Enseignement 
Superieur, France's university educational system between 1884 and 1902. 
Finally, almost half a century after Lachelier started teaching, Brunschvicg, the 
last great neo-Kantian of that period, concluded: "From 1870 on, a philosoph-
ical University has been built in France that should bear the name of Lachelier, 
just like the Old University bears the name of Victor Cousin:'66 The main neo-
Kantian figures of this new "philosophical university" are Emile Boutroux, Emile 
Meyerson,67 Leon Brunschvicg, and Octave Hamelin. 
After Lachelier, Boutroux is the key figure in the development of French neo-
Kantianism.68 He is at the center of the intellectual and the institutional network 
62. Desire Nolen, Kant et la ph ilosophie du XIX siecle (Montpellier: Martel Aine, 1877), 12. 
63. He neglected to mention the important contributions from Italian neo-Kantianism. 
64. Emile Boutroux, La Philosophie de Kant: Cours de M. Emile Boutroux (Sorbonne 1896- 1897) 
(Paris: Vrin, 1926), 12. 
65. Cf. Charles Lyon-Caen, "Notice sur la vie et les travaux de M. Louis Liard;' Seances et travaux 
de l'Academie des Sciences Morales et Politiques 81 (1921), and Alain Renaut, Les Revolutions 
de l'universite (Paris: Calmann-Levy, 1995), 156ff. 
66. Leon Brunschvicg, Ecrits Philosophiques, 3 vols (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1951-
58), vol. 2, 206. 
67. Emile Meyerson (1859-1933) , a Polish chemist who emigrated to Germany, then to France, 
exerted a strong influence on French philosophy, although, like Renouvier, he was never 
completely part of the system. His antipositivism, his Kantian and neocritical background 
as well as his discussion of contemporary science and his participation in discussions with 
Poincare, Brunschvicg, and Langevin make him a noteworthy figure worthy of the renewed 
interest he is attracting. 
68. Cf. Fabien Capeilleres, "Genealogie d 'un Neokantisme Fran~ais: a Propos d'Emile BoutrouX;' 
Revue de metaphysique et de morale, Neokantismes 3 (1997) , and "To Reach for Metaphysics: 
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constitutive of the French higher education system. His work can be under-
stood as an attempt to carryon the spiritualism of his masters, Ravaisson and 
Lachelier, in a Kantian guise. The problem around which his thought revolves 
is the reconciliation of the universal validity of scientific laws (which seems to 
involve an ontological necessity and therefore determinism), human freedom 
(the condition for morality), and religion. 
This problem is precisely what he calls "Kant's problem": "How is science 
possible? How is morality possible? How is the reconciliation of science and 
morality possible?"69 And later he states: "Kant's problem is ours. His writings 
talk about us: nostra res agitur. "70 Despite several themes that can be considered 
Kantian, Boutroux's solution to the problem is not Kantian, and one cannot 
but assert that his understanding of the a priori and of the transcendental that 
he rejects is rather weak. One of the main interests is his treatment of science, 
which is both metaphysical and epistemological, and he is closely related to 
major scientists of the period such as his own son, Pierre Boutroux, and his 
brother-in-law, Henri Poincare l Boutroux's Kantianism has also been consid-
ered an influence on Poincare's contributions to the problem of hypotheses, as 
well as on his conventionalism.72 Within this constellation, the Tannery brothers 
were also of major importance. 
Brunschvicg constitutes the apex of French neo-Kantianism, a status also 
claimed by Renouvier's heir, Hamelin?3 Brunschvicg's achievement was a 
strictly methodological understanding of what he calls "the idea of critique:' 
His achievement is deployed via a "wider and richer" use of "the truth of the 
transcendental method:'74 The general movement is similar to the "historiza-
tion" and the "dynamization" of the transcendental operating in German neo-
Kantianism, in particular, the Marburg School. 
What will be left of the theory of transcendental consciousness, once one 
recognizes that algebra and geometry, mechanics and physics do not resign 
themselves to this docile immobility that Kant expected? And what will one 
n 
69. Boutroux, La Philosophie de Kant, 9; see also 266. 
70. Ibid., 11-12. This is a reference to Horace's "Nam tua res agitur, paries cum proximus ardet" 
. (it becomes your concern when your neighbor's wall is on fire). 
71. Cf. Mary Jo Nye, "The Boutroux Circle and Poincare's Conventionalism;' Journal of the History 
of Ideas 1 (1979). 
72. Cf. Les Sources et les courants de la philosophie contemporaine en France (Paris: Felix Aican, 
1933),351. 
73. This is a perspective held for instance by Dominique Parodi; see La Philosophie contempo-
raine en France (Paris: Felix Aican, 1919). Brunschvicg <:nswers in "L'Orientation du ratio-
nalism" (Berits Philosophiques, vol. 2, 25): "we do not find any trace of critical thought in 
neo-criticism:' 
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make of the fact that, during the nineteenth century, they broke the limits that 
the "Transcendental Aesthetic:' the "Transcendental Analytic;' and the First 
Metaphysical Principles of the Science of Nature had commanded them to respect 
as the finallayout?75 
The answer is somewhat brutal: "we should leave to some neo-Kantians and 
to Kant himself the postulate of this solidarity between the idea of critique and 
the table of the forms or the categories, since we know today that this solidarity 
expresses the most superficial and fragile aspect of the doctrine:'76 Brunschvicg 
then proceeds to pOint to a cleavage in the transcendental method: "The method 
put to work by the transcendental deduction is a reflexive analysis; it starts from 
science considered as a fact, and goes back to the a priori forms of intuitions and 
pure concepts of the understanding:'77 This first moment, reminiscent of Cohen, 
is legitimate in Brunschvicg's eyes, especially since it reverts to the unity of tran-
scendental apperception, an important element for someone who also wants to 
claim the spiritualist inheritance. However, when a philosopher considers the 
system of categories as fixed once and for all, and limits deduction to that of the 
principles of a determined moment of physics (Newton, for instance), then the 
progressive synthesis that leads to all the dimensions of spirit will be lacking. 
Brunschvicg's understanding of the "idea of critique" will be exercised as 
"reflexive analysis" on all fields of human knowledge: science, morality, religion, 
art, and history, in order to produce the system of critical idealism that presents 
the life of the spirit in all its directions as well as in its unity. 
Brunschvicg's enormous influence was at its peak in the 1920s. Setting aside 
his impressive intellectual stature, we see that he exerted his influence through 
all dimensions of the French system: he held a key teaching position at the 
Sorbonne (for thirty years, beginning in 1909), was president of the Agregation 
(1936-38), for many years was part of the academic-political network that 
oversaw the philosophy curriculum and the awarding of positions and grants, 
and was founder of the journal Revue de M8aphysique et de Morale (with Xavier 
Leon in 1893) and of the Societe Fran<;:aise de Philosophie (1901, with Leon and 
Andre Lalande). 
At the end of the nineteenth century, neo-Kantianism was not only the 
preeminent philosophy in France, but had also become the philosophie offici-
elle. But soon Boutroux left center stage in favor of his most famous student and 
the true heir of spiritualism, Henri Bergson; Bachelard overshadowed Meyerson; 
Brunschvicg became the embodiment of the mandarin, confronted by young 
75. Ibid., 152. 
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materialists such as Georges Politzer78 and Marxists such as Paul Nizan79 or 
by philosophers such as Sartre and Merleau-Ponty. These thinkers found their 
inspirations in new figures in German philosophy - the early Husserl, Heidegger 
- and subscribed to their criticisms of Kant. 
To take a look at the influence of neo-Kantianism on post -Second World War 
French intellectual life, one of the most interesting developments of French neo-
Kantianism is the role it played in the rise of structuralism. Martial Gueroult's 
(1891-1976) reflections on the Kantian concept of architectonics, his famil-
iarity with the neo- Kantian "quarrel of the system;'80 and his reading of Karl 
Mannheim's Die Strukturanalyse der Erkenntnistheorie (The structural analysis 
of epistemology, 1922), resulted in his highly interesting structural methodology 
concerning the history of philosophy. Considering all genetic, chronological, and 
biographical studies merely preliminary steps, he argued that the analysis should 
proceed to an internal reconstruction of the philosophical work considered as a 
monument constructed by layers and successions of proofs. The more original 
rational conditions of the system consist in its transcendental conditions, just as, 
in Kant, the structure of the idea of pure reason forms a transcendental condition 
of a system. Victor Goldschmidt followed this path in his work in the history of 
philosophy.8! But more important is the affiliation with Jules Vuillemin (1920-
2001),82 in which the meaning of the concept of structure shifted. It originally 
78. See his 1926 attack in Bcrits, Jacques Debouzy (ed.) (Paris: Editions Sociales, 1969) 1,29. 
79. Cf. Paul Nizan, Les Chiens de garde (Paris: Rieder, 1932). 
SO. The quarrel of the system was a fierce debate regarding two issues: (i) Could philosophy 
fulfill its claim to be a science only through the form of a system? And, given a positive 
answer to this first question: (ii ) What kind of system' should it be? Regarding the first 
claim, Hermann Cohen writes: "The philosophy reaches its concept only as system" (Logik 
der rein en Erkenntniss, 3rd ed. [Berlin: Bruno Cassirer, 1922], 601). Concerning the second 
claim, Natorp (like Cassirer) has a preference for the concept of a systematic: "Systematic, not 
system" (in Philosophische Systematik [Hamburg: Felix Meiner, 1958], 1). Rickert is also quite 
clear: "Unsystematic thought means unphilosophical thought" (in Allgemeine Grundlegung 
der Philosophie [Tubingen: J. c. B. Mohr, 1921 ], II; see also Grundprobleme der Philosophie 
[Tlibingen: J. c. B. Mohr, 1934], 1-25). He develops the concept of an "open system." What 
is here at stake is to be systematic without being dogmatic (or Hegelian!). See Christian 
Krijnen, Philosophie als System: Prinzipientheoretische Untersuchungen zum Systemgedanken 
bei Hegel, im Neukantianismus und in der Gegenwartsphilosophie (Wurzburg: Kiinigshausen 
& Neumann, 2008) . 
81. Victor Goldschmidt (1914-81) was well known for his application of a structuralist method 
of reading, inaugurated by Gueroult, to ancient philosophy (Plato, Aristotle, Epicurus, the 
Stoics, and so on) as well as to Rousseau. For some reservations, see Jacques Brunschwig, 
"Goldschmidt and Gueroult: Some Facts, Some Enigmas;' Archiv fur Geschichte der Philosophie 
88 (2006). 
82. Cf. Joseph Vidal-Rosset, "De Martial Gueroult it Jules Vuillemin, analyse d 'une Filiation;' 
in Le Paradigme de la filiation, Jean Gayon and Jean-Jacques Wunenberger (eds) (Paris: 
L'Harmattan, 1995). 
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referred to a scientificity gained through systematicity, but systematicity was now 
understood through logic and mathematical axiomatic. Gilles-Gaston Granger 
(1920- ) played an important role in this transformation. These intellectual affini-
ties (and friendships) resulted in academic appointments: Gueroult, who held 
the Chair of History and Technology of Philosophical Systems at the College de 
France (1951-62), nominated Vuillemin for a Chair of Philosophy of Knowledge 
(1962-90). And Vuillemin appointed Foucault to succeed him at the University 
of Clermont-Ferrand, then at the College de France (where he held a Chair of 
History of Systems of Thought, 1970-84); Granger succeeded Foucault in 1986, 
renaming the Chair "Comparative EpistemologY:'83 
This logico-mathematical transformation of the concept of structure also 
impacted the writing of the history of philosophy (as well as history itself), 
leading, for instance, on the one hand, to the work of Michel Serres and Daniel 
Parrochia and, on the other, to Althusser's praxis in his reading of Capital and 
Foucault's "archeologY:'84 The end of this story is better known, although often in 
a very confused fashion owing to the omission of the first episodes: to the math-
ematical paradigm a linguistic one would be added (Saussure, Benveniste) that in 
turn would lead, by a complete reversal, to neostructuralism or poststructuralism, 
while a Heideggerian intellectual background (blended with various proportions 
of Nietzsche, Marx, and Freud) would come to replace the Kantian paradigm. 
Today, neo-Kantianism is still active in France: in epistemology, philosophy 
of mathematics, and philosophy of physics one might mention the work of Jean 
Petitot,85 Michel Bitbol, Jean Seidengart, and Pierre Kerszberg; Alexis Philonenko 
in the history of philosophy; Alain Renaut in moral and political philosophy as 
well as education; and a neo-Kantian, Luc Ferry, became minister of education. 
III. CONCLUSION 
To summarize, the label "neo-Kantianism" was applied to a variety of tenden-
cies within the philosophical scene in Europe, mainly Germany and France, to a 
83. It is also worth noting that Jacques Bouveresse, who presented his 1995 College de France 
Chair of Philosophy of Language and of Knowledge as "in a way succeeding" those of 
Vuillemin and Granger, devoted his 2007 and 2008 lectures to a question formulated after 
a title of Vuillemin's book: "What are philosophical systems?" The lectures not only dealt 
expliCitly with Vuillemin, but also with the tradition coming from Renouvier, Gueroult , and 
Hyppolite. 
*84. Serres and Foucault are discussed in essays by Derek Robbins and Timothy O'Leary in The 
History of Continental Philosophy: Volume 6. 
*85. The work ofJean Petitot is discussed in "The Structuralist Legacy" by Patrice Maniglier in The 
History of Continental Philosophy: Volume 7. 
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lesser extent Italy and the United Kingdom, at a certain period of time, roughly 
between 1870 and 1930.86 While the peak of this movement can be said to have 
come to an end after the First World War, the Second World War seemingly sent 
it into oblivion. In the late 1970s, neo-Kantianism's importance and dominance 
in its own days began to be rediscovered in scholarship. This led to a philosoph-
ical revival, which is now palpable in nearly all fields of philosophical work. 
For instance, the question of a priori knowledge is discussed in contemporary 
philosophy of mind, epistemology, and philosophy of science. It is also remark-
able that this European trend of "continental" philosophy is currently gaining 
leverage in the US, with the works and the influence ofJohn Rawls in ethics and 
political philosophy and, for example, Michael Friedman in both philosophy 
of science and the genesis of analytical philosophy. Today, neo-Kantianism is 
slowly regaining its status as a major interlocutor with phenomenology and 
analytical philosophy, a status first exemplified, for instance, by the relations 
between Husserl and Natorp and its influence on Carnap. 
In one sense, then, the term "neo-Kantianism" refers mainly to this period of 
time. In another sense, the term "neo-Kantian" can be understood in the manner 
in which philosophers today call themselves "neo-Fregean" or "neo-Pragmatist;' 
by which they mean an alliance to these philosophers, not in the letter or in 
correct exegesis of the great thinker's true intentions, but in the spirit of the 
philosophers in question. It is in this sense that the neo-Kantians discussed here 
perceived themselves as furthering Kant's true intentions, be it in dismissing 
some elements in Kant's system for the sake of others or emphasizing those that 
they perceived to reveal a true kernel in the midst of other problematic intu-
itions in Kant's thought. In this effort, they not only ~rought forth highly original 
avenues of Kant interpretation that are still essentially pursued today, but also 
produced a range of interesting new systematic approaches and theories that are 
far from obsolete and deserve to be studied anew.87 
If one were to summarize in the briefest terms its philosophical importance, 
one could call neo-Kantianism a philosophy of culture, whereby culture is itself 
the problematic philosophical term, the terminus ad quem. Philosophy, then, 
86. Regarding Italian neo-Kantianism, see Massimo Ferrari, lntroduzione a iI neocriticismo (Rome: 
Laterza, 1997) and, more specifically, I dati dellesperienza: II Neokantismo di Felice Tocco nella 
filosofia Italiana tra ottocento e novecento (Florence: L. S. Olschki, 1990). UK neo-Kantianism 
is more difficult to characterize since it forms components of another complex philosophical 
movement: British idealism. Philosophers such as T. H. Green (1836- 82), Edward Caird 
(1835-1908), and R. G. Collingwood (1889- 1943) are often identified as neo-Kantians. 
87. Two recent anthologies will help make neo-Kantianism more accessible for scholarship in 
the English language: Luft and Makkreel, Neo-Kantianism in Contemporary Philosophy, and 




SEBASTIAN LUFT AND FABIEN CAPEILLERES 
is placed in the service of human culture in modern society, which values and 
upholds the fundamental beliefs of the Renaissance and the Enlightenment: 
reason, equality, freedom. Neo-Kantianism stands, to borrow a phrase from 
Ursula Renz, for a culture of rationality and the rationality of culture. Whether 
such an ideal and the consequences following from it will be allowed to survive 
in the so-called age of postmodernity is another question. Be that as it may, both 
as a starting-point for understanding the philosophical tendencies that would 
emerge and define the twentieth century, and as a vast quarry of inspiring ideas 
and timeless systematic approaches, one will need to reassess the neo-Kantian 
movement. 88 
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